The Arsenal: Betwixt and Between – A Pre-Season Assessment
In the summer of 2016, Arsenal finds itself in an enviable yet unenviable position.
Enviable in that the first team achieved its best finish since 2005 in the Premier League and has the strongest imaginable financial foundation. But the club’s spot is not so desirable because its strengths have raised expectations to hysterical levels.
Commentators professional and amateur have found benefits, either monetary or emotional, in feeding the hysteria. Speculation and outrage dominate, especially during the summer silly season, when no meaningful on-field action is around to grab our attention.
Three years ago, I began taking advantage of that downtime to assess Arsenal’s state. It’s an unavoidably presumptuous exercise because I am not privy to leadership discussions at the club, knowledgeable about performance objectives there, or experienced in attempting to achieve comparable objectives in the professional sports business.
Still, I think it’s both important and interesting to analyze the club’s situation based on specific developments. Doing so reduces the effects of transfer Twitter-tattle and helps us understand how Arsenal has evolved.
Indicators of progress
The factors that would advance the club haven’t changed substantially since 2013; their influence on Arsenal’s fortunes has varied over the years, though. Here’s an update.
1. The club’s own financial strength. Clear. Arsenal appear to have more money in the bank than any other club in world football, at least according to the reliable Swiss Ramble blog (“Arsenal – Brass in Pocket” ). The Arsenal Supporters’ Trust estimates the May cash balance at almost £200 million, with about half that sum available to fund player acquisitions and increases in the wage bill. This doesn’t even include Arsenal’s take of the Premier League broadcast revenue from the 2015-16 campaign—the highest such figure ever–£101 million. This means that manager Arsène Wenger and his staff have the wherewithal to continue to acquire talent at the level of Mesut Özil, Alexis Sanchez, and Petr Cech.
2. The different level of transfer target. Steady success. Arsenal started its off-season business with the acquisition of the young yet accomplished Swiss midfielder Granit Xhaka. He showed his worth as one of the top performers at this summer’s European Championships. As such, his arrival solidifies the trend that began in earnest with Özil in 2013, when Arsenal again became a feasible destination for the upper echelon of players. If the club can convince one or even two more outstanding talents to join before current transfer window closes, it will confirm that it’s operating in exclusive territory.
3. Unrest elsewhere. Deceptively promising. Although Antonio Conte, Pep Guardiola, and Jose Mourinho all bring impressive credentials to their new roles at Chelsea, Manchester City, and Manchester United, respectively, and although their new employers will provide financial backing for massive overhauls, the trio may not enjoy immediate success. That’s because they have to integrate players unfamiliar to each other, the management style, and the league. As a result, Wenger and Arsenal may have a window of opportunity in 2016-17 before the challenge gets more formidable the following season.
4. Continuity in Arsenal’s management and playing squad. Reasonable but not of unquestionable value. A year ago, Wenger touted the team’s chemistry and chose the unconventional strategy of relying on that collective understanding to carry Arsenal to glory. That choice did not pay off for the Gunners, while it did, in a fashion, for Claudio Ranieri and title-winners Leicester City. In the face of the correlation between financial outlay and league position, it’s hard to see this approach succeeding again. More promising would be a mix of continuity and top-level acquisitions, particularly in the attacking contingent.
5. Winning mentality of the current squad. Displayed in spurts. The group that carried Arsenal to two FA Cups remains in large part, and the league results against top competition (P8 W4 D3 L1 against other top-five teams) show that the team can still deliver on the day. Now the focus will have to be on playing at the same level against teams lower in the table; the defeat to Swansea and draws against West Ham and Crystal Palace ruined any chance of a spring run to close the gap with Leicester.
6. Exits of unwanted players. Manageable. It’s a good bet that Mathieu Debuchy will leave Arsenal after his agitations resulted in a loan move in January, while the midfield trio of Mikel Arteta, Mathieu Flamini, and Tomas Rosicky all departed at the expirations of their contracts. Calling any of them unwanted would be unfair, but age and injury limited their contributions on the pitch. The question is whether any of the remaining players can attain their influence off it.
7. Impact of Financial Fair Play (FFP). Negligible. The Premier League’s broadcast windfall and UEFA’s loose enforcement mean that spending on players has few, if any, restrictions. It’s not the ideal scenario as Arsenal planned for the long-term, so the club will need to adapt to the new landscape.
Signs of stagnation
1. The existing distance between Arsenal and the top of the table. Mixed signals, again. Arsenal amassed four fewer points (71) than in the previous season and finished with eight points fewer than it collected in 2013-14. The Gunners couldn’t capitalize when their traditional rivals for the title faltered. Yet the runner-up finish was Arsenal’s best overall showing in 11 years, and, as noted above, the performance against top opposition was strong. Delivering similar results throughout the league campaign will be required as the competition intensifies.
2. The risk-averse transfer approach. Done. Although Arsenal won’t spend for the sake of spending, the club has displayed its willingness to take financial risks on proven talents like Sanchez, potential stars like Xhaka, and promising youngsters like Calum Chambers. Considerations other than cost—ability level, playing style, and mental outlook—seem to be more influential in the efforts to acquire players.
3. Lack of experience in transfers at the high level. Righted. Arsenal remain at the table with other elite clubs, having successfully negotiated for players with Real Madrid, Barcelona, Manchester United, and Chelsea in recent years. Whether that experience is of any benefit in this summer’s transfer dealings, only the next five weeks will tell.
4. Uncertain enforcement of FFP. Pointless. See #7 above. As in last year’s assessment, the main advantage Arsenal may have relates to home-grown players. So far, none of the departing players belonged to that category, leaving Arsenal with 10 home-grown players and five under-21 players among the 31 currently listed on the club’s first-team roster. The club can make a maximum of 25 over-21 players eligible for Premier League competition (under-21’s don’t count), of which no more than 17 can be non-home-grown. Suffice it to say, Arsenal enjoy considerable flexibility here, while teams recruiting lots of players from abroad may not.
5. The composition of the Arsenal board. Unchanged and concerning. The homogeneity of the Arsenal board receives a lot less scrutiny than transfer activity, tactical approaches, and even club finances, but it carries the biggest risk for the club. When Wenger moves away from managing the first team, a small group of white males will plan for and decide his successor. Diverse views tend to lead to sounder decisions in such circumstances.
Where things stand
This review suggests that progress at Arsenal has slowed somewhat over the past year. The long-term arc is definitely positive, but there are signs that the club is finding it challenging to reach greater heights. That shouldn’t be surprising in an extremely competitive field such as the Premier League.
